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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. **78-826****ELLSWORTH H. MOSHER,**
*Petitioner**v.***HON. HOWARD T. MARKEY****HON. GILES S. RICH****HON. PHILLIP B. BALDWIN****HON. DONALD E. LANE****HON. JACK R. MILLER****The Chief Judge and the Associate
Judges of the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals****and****CHIRANJIB K. SARKAR,**
Respondents

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS**

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November, 1978

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**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
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Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("C.C.P.A.") entered on August 24, 1978 in the case entitled *In the Matter of the Petition of Ellsworth H. Mosher*.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the C.C.P.A. is not yet officially reported. It is reprinted hereinafter in Appendix A. An unofficial report appears at 199 U.S.P.Q. 12.

JURISDICTION

The judgement of the C.C.P.A. (App. 1a) was entered on August 24, 1978, and this petition is being filed within ninety days thereafter.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1256.

The basis for federal jurisdiction in the court below was petitioner's request (App. 4c) for a certified copy of a specified portion of the record of a patent appeal then pending before the court, in accordance with C.C.P.A. Rule 1.2(b).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the First, Fifth, Ninth or Tenth Amendments to the Constitution are violated by the C.C.P.A., an Article III federal appellate court, by that court's sealing the court record of a direct patent appeal and barring any public attendance at the statutorily authorized oral hearing, where that court has heretofore uniformly had open records and open hearings for all patent cases since it was established.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND RULE OF COURT PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The constitutional provisions are the following: The First, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution.

The statutory provisions are the following:

The Act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 117, §16

The Act of March 3, 1839, 5 Stat. 353, §11

The Act of March 2, 1929, Public No. 914, 70th Congress, §2(a)

28 U.S. Code §§211, 1256 and 2071

35 U.S. Code §§122 and 141-144

The court rules are the following:

C.C.P.A. Rules 1.2(b) and 5.13(g)

The foregoing, or at least the relevant portions thereof, are reproduced hereinafter in Appendix D (App. 1d).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 11, 1978, the C.C.P.A. handed down a landmark decision in the direct patent appeal *In re Sarkar*, C.C.P.A. Appeal No. 78-554, pursuant to a motion by Sarkar under C.C.P.A. Rule 5.13(g) to seal the record and to hear oral argument with respect thereto *in camera*

"so that material disclosed in the involved patent application [of Sarkar] may be retained, in the event of an adverse decision, as a trade secret".

The court granted the motion. The court's opinion is reported at 575 F.2d 870, 197 U.S.P.Q. 788. It is reprinted hereinafter in Appendix B (App. 1b).

On June 8, 1978 petitioner filed a motion (later designated by the court as a petition) requesting the court to vacate or overrule its decision of May 11, 1978 so that petitioner could secure copies of portions of the Sarkar record on file with the court, or alternatively, for modification of the court's decision at least to the extent of authorizing petitioner to be present during oral argument and to instruct the Clerk of the court to give petitioner reasonable notice in advance of the date set for the oral hearing (Appendix C).

Simultaneously therewith, petitioner filed a letter order (App. 4c) for a certified copy of certain portions of the record of Sarkar, and tendered a sum of money more than sufficient to cover the cost of the desired certified copy.

On August 24, 1978, the C.C.P.A. handed down its decision denying the petition. See Appendix A (App. 1a).

A motion for a stay of further proceedings in *Sarkar* until this Court could act on a petition for certiorari was denied by the CCPA on November 2, 1978. The motion and the denial are reproduced in Appendices E and F.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

With a single stroke of the pen, the C.C.P.A. last May shattered an unbroken tradition of 139 years of open court records and open court hearings in direct appeals from the Patent Office. This Court is now urged to undo that action via certiorari to the C.C.P.A.

Never before in the history of direct appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office") has the record in the court been sealed or a closure order made. The court below itself referred to this as an "extraordinary action of the court" (App. 5b).

This action of the C.C.P.A. is highly prejudicial to the long-established custom of the courts in this country to remain generally free and open to its citizens so that the public may enjoy, and continue to enjoy, the blessings of these United States in the respects indicated that were all too often denied to citizens of other lands¹ up until modern times—and sometimes even in very recent years.²

This right of free access to the court is so very fundamental and precious that it ought not to be sacrificed in favor of the private interest of any particular appellant before the C.C.P.A.

It should be said that petitioner is in no way connected with Sarkar, either directly or indirectly, and has no interest (commercial or otherwise) in the particular subject matter involved in Sarkar's appeal.

The Sarkar motion to seal, etc., is contrary to the public's ancient common law "right to know" what is going on in its courts.

The principle was firmly established long ago in this very kind of direct appeal from the Patent Office in *Ex parte Drawbaugh*, 2 App.D.C. 404 (1894), and *In re Sackett*, 30 C.C.P.A. 1214, 136 F.2d 248 (C.C.P.A. 1943). See also *In re Mosher*, 45 C.C.P.A. 701, 248 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1957).

In its opinion in the case at bar, the C.C.P.A. emphasized the fact that Sarkar filed his motion simultaneously with the filing of the Patent Office record (App. 4b). That difference in timing does not require a result differing from the cases mentioned above. It does not, as a matter

¹ One has only to think of the English Courts of the Star Chamber and the courts of the Spanish Inquisition.

² In the October 1978 issue of the American Bar Association Journal, see J.A. Cohen, "Will China Have a Formal Legal System" at p. 1510, and R.B. Ginsburg, "American Bar Association Delegation Visits the People's Republic of China", at p. 1516.

of law, change the ancient "balance" between the interest of the public on the one hand and the private interest of this particular appellant Sarkar on the other.

A direct appeal to a court (in the earliest statute, to the "Chief Justice" individually) in a case of the kind here involved has been provided for since the Act of March 3, 1839, 5 Stat. 353,³ although slightly earlier a remedy by bill in equity was permitted in the special case of interference "with an unexpired patent previously granted". §16 of the Act of July 4, 1835, 5 Stat. 117. See P. J. Federico, *Evolution of Patent Office Appeals*, 22 J.Pat.Off.Soc. 838-64 and 920-49 (1940).

No instance is known where during the intervening 139 years a court granted a motion to seal the record in a direct appeal of the kind here involved. Only one case comes to mind where secrecy was imposed not in a direct appeal from the Patent Office but in a trial *de novo* action under 35 U.S.C. §145. See *Isenstead v. Watson, Comm. of Patents*, 157 F.Supp. 7 (D.C. D.C. 1957). Cf. what seem to be certain interesting dicta in *Montgomery et al v. Kingsland, Comm. of Patents*, 83 U.S. App. D.C. 66, 166 F.2d 953 (1948) at 956.

Accordingly, this is a *case of first impression* in this Court.⁴ Apart from a passing remark obviously not necessary to the decision in *Ex parte Uppercu*, 239 U.S. 435 (1915)⁵, no instance is known where this Court has had

³ The first such direct appeal was *In re Kemper*, Fed.Cas.No. 7687 (Cir. Ct., D.C., May 1841). That appeal was decided by "Chief Judge" Cranch of the Circuit Court.

⁴ It was recognized as a case of first impression in the court below. See App. 3b.

⁵ In *Uppercu*, which was an original petition for mandamus to enforce the right of access to certain depositions and exhibits on file in, but sealed by order of, a Federal District Court, this Court remarked that

(footnote continued)

occasion to consider the important question presented by this petition.

The only contrary ruling in a lower federal court seems to be that of *In re McLean*, Fed.Cas.No. 8877 (C.C. Ohio, 1879)⁶ where the court remarked that:

"It is, therefore, very clear to my mind that the unlimited right of a citizen of the United States to inspect and examine all the records and papers belonging to the court does not exist."

However, an interesting footnote reveals that,

"The judges afterwards granted *ex gratia* what they ruled the petitioner was not entitled to, as a matter of law."

There is authority indicating that secret court hearings in colonial days were frowned upon. See the Charter of Fundamental Laws of 1676 of West Jersey which indicated that:

"in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal, any person or persons, inhabitants of the said Province may freely come into, and attend the said courts, and hear and be present, at all or any such tryals as shall be there

(footnote continued)

"[n]either the parties to the original cause nor the deponents have any privilege, and the mere unwillingness of an unprivileged person to have the evidence used cannot be strengthened by such a judicial fiat as this, forbidding it, however proper and effective the sealing may have been as against the public at large."

As Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion clearly reveals, however, the petitioner in *Uppercu* was an interested person and not merely a member of the "public at large", and so the concluding clause of the quoted portion is pure dictum. Note that the requested access was granted.

⁶ Cited and therefore already considered by the court below in *Mosher*, *supra*. This same case was reported elsewhere as *In re Cincinnati Enquirer*, Fed.Cas.No. 2719. It was not a patent case.

had or passed, that justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert manner . . . [emphasis supplied]." 5 F. Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America* 2551 (1909).

In colonial Pennsylvania it was declared in 1682 that "all courts shall be open, and justice shall neither be sold, denied nor delayed." *Id.* at 3060.

In *United States v. Cianfrani*, 573 F.2d 835 at 851 (3rd Cir. 1978), the court remarked that:

"Public confidence cannot long be maintained where important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors and then announced in conclusive terms to the public, with the record supporting the court's decision sealed from public view".

In Wigmore's classic treatise on the law of evidence (Chadbourn's revision), Vol. 6, 1976, we find at page 438 the following comment:

"In all experience, secret tribunals have exhibited abuses which have been wanting in courts whose procedure was public."

and

"The educative effect of public attendance is a material advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance acquired with the methods of government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies is secured which could never be inspired by a system of secrecy."

At page 439, Wigmore quoted from a 1913 divorce case in Great Britain where Earl Loreburn remarked as follows:

"I cannot think that the High Court has an unqualified power in its discretion to hear civil proceedings with closed doors. The inveterate rule is that justice shall be administered in open Court."

In reporting a decision by the House of Lords in a case originating from Canada some forty years ago, it was remarked that:

" . . . publicity is the authentic hall-mark of judicial as distinct from administrative procedure . . . The actual presence of the public is never of course necessary. Where Courts are held in remote parts of the Province, as they frequently must be, there may be no members of the public available to attend. But even so the Court must be open to any who may present themselves for admission. The remoteness of the possibility of any public attendance must never by judicial action be reduced to the certainty that there will be none." (*loc. cit.* at 440).

Wigmore arrives at the following conclusion:

"In general, therefore, and as a rule, a trial must be conducted in such a way as to allow the access of the general public". (*loc. cit.* at 441).

In a footnote to one of the briefs of *amici curiae*⁷ in a case now pending before this Court (*Gannett Co., Inc. v. Hon. Daniel A. DePasquale*, No. 77-1301), *amici* at page 12 remark in a footnote that

⁷ The Deadline Club; The New York City Chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi; and The Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi.

"So important is public knowledge of the activities of the judiciary that it could be argued that access to this information [from which the press was excluded] by the public is an extra-constitutional right, i.e., one never surrendered to federal authority but rather is reserved for the people, as recognized under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1964)."

The action of the court below is directly contrary to the spirit of the day which seems to be moving towards greater "openness" in governmental operations. One need only refer to the well known "Sunshine Laws" which have proliferated in the last few years. See the numerous laws referred to under that heading in Shepard's "Acts and Cases by Popular Names", 1978 Supplement, page 354, where the statutes of a large number of states are cited after initial reference to the federal Freedom of Information Act.

If a practice of 139 years of openness is to be departed from in respect of direct appeals from the Patent Office, this should only be done via unmistakable mandate from the Congress and not by the court below.

The Applicable Patent Statute Precludes Secrecy in the C.C.P.A.

The decision of the C.C.P.A. is untenable because the decision to seal or not to seal the record in an *ex parte* patent appeal of the kind here involved is not a matter for the discretion of the court. This is clear from a consideration of the overall statutory scheme envisioned by the Congress for dealing with patent applications in and from the Patent Office.

Thus, in the Patent Act of 1952, the specific statutory mandate regarding the confidential status of patent ap-

plications⁸ is embodied *exclusively* in 35 U.S.C. §122, which reads as follows:

"Applications for patent shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of the applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner." [Emphasis added.]

The Congress could just as easily have included in §122 (or elsewhere in the statute) a reference to the courts to which appeals are taken from the Patent Office, had it intended secrecy to be applicable to C.C.P.A. records relating to applications for patent.

The statutory mandate governing the proceedings in direct *ex parte* patent appeals to the C.C.P.A. is embodied in §§141-144. But whereas §122 positively states that "applications for patent shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office, etc.", *there is no corresponding language regarding secrecy in any of §§141-144 of the same statute.*

It follows that the sealing of the record, etc., cannot be justified under §§141-144 because language similar to that found in §122 does not appear in §§141-144. The omission should be regarded as significant. This Court has made the application of the principle clear in *Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu*, 307 U.S. 5 (1939). There at page 14 this Court said that:

⁸ For a recent detailed history of the rule of secrecy in the Patent Office—going back to 1854—see *Sears v. Gottschalk, Commissioner*, 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974) at 128-132. The practice embodied in the earlier Patent Office rules was not incorporated into the patent statutes until nearly a century later (1952).

"[w]e have no way of knowing whether the discrimination results from inadvertence or some undisclosed legislative policy, but, in order to redress the disadvantage under which one in the petitioner's situation suffers, we should have to read into the law words which plainly are missing. We cannot thus rewrite the statute." [Emphasis added, footnote omitted.]

The C.C.P.A. should not be permitted to, in effect, rewrite §§141-144 to track §122 by the expedient of promulgating a new rule of court not in harmony with the controlling statute. The statutory authority to do so is conspicuous by its absence.

The rule-making power of any federal court is by statute relatively restricted. Thus, 28 U.S.C. §2071 specifically states that

"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court." [Emphasis added.]

No court is entitled to regard itself as completely untrammeled in this regard. The decisions in this Court are uniformly to that effect, *Heckers v. Fowler*, 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 123 (1864); *Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co.*, 263 U.S. 629, 635-6 (1924); *Johnson v. Manhattan Railway Co.*, 289 U.S. 479, 503 (1933).

From Earliest Times Up Until May of this Year It Was Always Supposed That C.C.P.A. Records in Direct Patent Appeals were Open to the Public

At the time of the passage of the Patent Act of 1952 it was generally thought by all concerned that the records of

the C.C.P.A. in direct *ex parte* appeals from the Patent Office were freely available to any member of the public. See the *Commentary on the New Patent Act* by P. J. Federico⁹ at 35 U.S.C.A. at pages 1 et seq (1954). It is of course well known that Mr. Federico was very active in the able group that assisted in drafting the various bills that finally became the Patent Act of 1952.

During the First Judicial Conference of the C.C.P.A.¹⁰ held on April 30, 1974, Mr. Joseph Nakamura, the Solicitor of the Patent Office, remarked (page 223) that

"the *in camera* proceeding rule is in essence a conflict with the policy of open public records of the court."

The Patent Office has long believed—and has so informed the public—that records in the C.C.P.A. relating to direct patent appeals are freely available to the public. In its semi-official *Manual of Patent Examining Procedure*, a publication of the Patent Office, §1216.01, page 220.7 (Revision No. 52, April 1977), it is specifically stated that

"[s]ince a transcript of the application [for patent] becomes a part of the [C.C.P.A.] court record, it may of course be inspected there by anyone, *In re Mosher*, 45 C.C.P.A. 701; 115 USPQ 140."

⁹ His exact words on the point (at p. 36) are:

"In the case of an appeal to the court (section 141) the application will become available to the public since a copy is made of record in the court and the court records are public." [Emphasis added]

The Federico *Commentary, etc.* has been cited by this Court on at least one occasion as apparently authoritative, *Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc.*, 365 U.S. 336 (1961) at 342, footnote 8, as well as on numerous occasions by the C.C.P.A. (most recently in *Solder Removal Co. v. Int. Trade Comm.*, 582 F2d. 628 at 633, 199 U.S.P.Q. 129 at 133, footnote 10).

¹⁰ The proceedings are reported at 65 F.R.D. 171 et seq.

Note especially the significant words "of course".

This Court is urged to grant certiorari herein as it did in the case of *Gannett Co., Inc. v. Hon. Daniel A. DePasquale*, No. 77-1301, where somewhat related issues are involved, although in a criminal context and on behalf of the press. In fact, a ruling favorable to the petitioner in that case now pending before this Court may well clearly indicate without more that the decision in the court below here was equally in error on the question of closure.

In *Sheppard v. Maxwell*, 384 U.S. 333 at 349 (1966), this Court noted that:

The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has long been reflected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials'.

In *Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia*, U.S. , 56 L.Ed.2d. 1 (May 1, 1978), this Court observed at page 10 that:

The operations of the courts . . . are matters of utmost public concern.

There is an early English case having some aspects in common with this case. In *In re Lacy's Patent*, Chancery, July 25, 1816, 1 Abbott's Patent Cases 271 (Brodix, Washington, 1887), Lacy had invented a machine "for making French lace of the most beautiful texture". Application was made to the Court of Chancery "praying that his lordship would not put the great seal" to the patent because Lacy wanted to keep his specification secret for fifteen months. Lacy urged that if this specification was not kept secret the French might copy it; "but his lordship could not establish a new principle merely to prevent the French from smuggling; . . ."

A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE D.C. CIRCUIT AND THE C.C.P.A.

There is a strong likelihood of conflict between the present D.C. Circuit and the C.C.P.A. As already noted, *Drawbaugh* ruled squarely *against* secrecy of court records in a direct patent appeal of the very kind here involved. The jurisdiction formerly vested by statute in the *Drawbaugh* court in respect of direct patent appeals from the Patent Office has (since 1929) been vested in the C.C.P.A.¹¹ If the question of secrecy were *now* to be raised in a §145 civil action in the District Court as in *Isenstead*, *supra*, and were to be carried on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit¹², it is at least quite likely that that court would rule the same way as did its predecessor-in-jurisdiction, the *Drawbaugh* court, thereby creating a clear conflict in decisions by Article III appellate courts of equal stature.

This potential—perhaps probable—conflict should be settled by this court *in limine*.

PETITIONER HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF A RIGHT GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION

The closure ruling in the court below violates rights reserved to the people by virtue of the Fifth and Ninth Amendments because not made pursuant to a specific grant of authority to the United States. Consequently, the decision in the case at bar violates petitioner's right of free and unrestricted access to the records and proceedings in the C.C.P.A., contrary to the necessary and obvious

¹¹ The C.C.P.A. has been an Article III court since 1958. See 28 U.S.C. §211. In 1929 it acquired the jurisdiction over patent appeals formerly vested in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. See the Act of March 2, 1929 (App.)

¹² The successor in name to the *Drawbaugh* court.

intendment of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

It is only in this Court that petitioner can secure the relief to which as a citizen of these United States he believes himself to be entitled.

**PETITIONER SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO
ATTEND THE HEARING IN SARKAR**

As an alternative, it is respectfully submitted that at the very least the petitioner should be permitted to attend the hearing when *Sarkar* is reached for oral argument in the C.C.P.A.

As this Court pointed out in *Craig v. Harney*, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) at 374:

A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property.

The ruling of the court below cannot be reconciled with what this Court said in *Craig*.

A Suggested Form of Summary Relief for Petitioner

Precedent exists for this Court not only to take a lively interest in a case having trade secrets aspects such as this, but also where as here the issue is of a simplicity belying its importance, to dispose of it on the merits summarily. See *Spevack v. Strauss*¹³ where this Court granted certiorari and at the same time summarily fashioned a remedy *per curiam*. 355 U.S. 601 (1958). During a later stage of that same proceeding this Court once again summarily fashioned a remedy, *per curiam*, in

¹³ A case against the members of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

response to another petition for writ of certiorari. See 359 U.S. 115 (1959).

It is therefore respectfully suggested that it would be entirely appropriate for the Court similarly to grant summary relief to petitioner here, without additional briefing and oral argument. The Court is urged to do so. In the event the Court sees fit to act on this suggestion, the authorities and arguments relied upon by the court below are dealt with at some length in Appendix G (App. 1g).

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully urges the Court to hear this case on its merits by issuing a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES A. WENDEL
HAROLD C. WEGNER

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MOSHER
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Suite 600, Crystal Mall 1
Arlington, Virginia 22202
(703) 920-8900

Attorneys for Petitioner

November 1978

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS
AND PATENT APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION
OF
ELLSWORTH H. MOSHER

DECIDED: August 24, 1978

Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN, LANE,
and MILLER, Associate Judges

DECISION ON PETITION
PER CURIAM.

Ellsworth H. Mosher petitions the court to vacate its order sealing the record and providing for oral argument *in camera* in a patent appeal before this court, or, in the alternative, to authorize petitioner's presence during the oral argument in that appeal. The petition¹ is *denied*.

The appeal in question is presently pending, but has not yet been heard. Petitioner is not a party to the appeal and has alleged no special interest therein.²

¹ Though the papers are designated as "motions," they constitute a petition and will be so designated here.

The clerk will return the \$50 tendered by petitioner.

The record being sealed, petitioner was unable at the time of filing to accomplish service upon the parties. The Court declines petitioner's invitation to serve the petition upon the parties.

² The petition is assertedly filed in the public interest, not on behalf of any client, and not for the purpose of commercializing information learned upon granting of the petition.

Petitioner argues: (1) the public's right of access to court records is more important than that of an appellant to "cloak his activities *** in secrecy;" (2) sealing the record in this appeal exposes the court to the future burden of innumerable motions to seal; (3) *Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.*, 98 S. Ct. 1306 (1978), is distinguishable, the tapes in *Nixon* having been played in public at trial, and the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974), having been referred to specifically in the Supreme Court's opinion; (4) CCPA Rule 5.13(g), authorizing *in camera* proceedings, is invalid, because, while 35 USC 122 of the Patent Act provides for retention of patent applications in confidence, §§141-144, governing review of Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) decisions, do not, and (5) *Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.*, 416 U.S. 470, 181 USPQ 673 (1974), is distinguishable because it involved trade secret misappropriation and whether state trade secret protection was preempted by federal patent law.

At common law, a member of the public may gain access to judicial records as a matter of right. *In re Motion of Mosher*, 45 CCPA 701, 704, 248 F.2d 956, 958, 115 USPQ 140, 141 (1957). Because our challenged prior order deprives petitioner of a right to which he would otherwise have been entitled, we assume, for purposes of this petition, that he has standing to challenge the order.

The actual target of the petition is CCPA Rule 5.13(g). That rule is merely declaratory of this court's inherent authority to protect the rights, including trade secret rights, of litigants. Petitioner fails to recognize that the public's right of access to court records does not in every instance override a litigant's claim to trade secret rights. In a free society, resting on a balance of individual rights and societal responsibilities, few if any rights are unlimited. Thus as was recognized in *Nixon, supra*, at

1312, the public's right of access to court records is not absolute.³ Courts, both state and federal, have traditionally "refused to permit their files to serve *** as sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing." *Id.* at 1312. See also *A. O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co. of Ohio*, 73 F.2d 531, 539 (CA6 1934) (case heard below *in camera*, no discussion of secret process in opinion on appeal, because of plaintiff's right to sealing of record at appellate level); *Isenstead v. Watson*, 157 F. Supp. 7, 8, 115 USPQ 408, 409 (D.C. D.C. 1957) (action against Commissioner of Patents under §145 held *in camera* on motion of applicant to protect secret product). State courts have traditionally held the public trial concept subject to the inherent power of the court to protect the rights of the parties, where the administration of justice so requires. See *People v. Jelke*, 308 N.Y. 56, , 123 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1959); *State v. O'Neill*, 273 Wis. 530, , 78 N.W.2d 921, 925-27 (1956) (writ of mandamus issued requiring trial court to take claimed trade secret evidence *in camera* and seal the record of the evidence so taken).

The silence of §§141-144 does not militate against this court's inherent authority to protect the trade secret and other rights of litigants as justice may require. Those sections, being part of Chapter 13 of Title 35, governing review of PTO decisions, are neither restricted nor controlled by the provisions of §122, a part of Chapter 11 of

³ Petitioner's allegation that *Nixon* is inapposite is without merit. The statements relating to public access to judicial records in *Nixon* are reflective of existing law. That the Court's references to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act bore no relation to trade secrets does not destroy its recognition that the public right of access to court records is less than absolute.

Title 35 governing applications for patent within the PTO.⁴

On the contrary, §122 and CCPA Rule 5.13(g) work together toward the goals of the patent system. Because of our prior order in the appeal in question, the appellate process will continue, keeping open the possibility that a patent may issue and that the public may thereby acquire full disclosure of the invention, including the trade secrets involved. An absence of Rule 5.13(g) would encourage, if not require, those who have disclosed trade secrets in a proffered exchange for the limited-term patent right to exclude others, to forego appeal and fall back upon the unlimited-term protection of trade secret laws, thereby denying the public early (or any) disclosure, and defeating the very purpose of the patent system.

In camera proceedings have been employed in §145 actions, brought by applicants against the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks in the District Court, *Iseninstead, supra*, and are contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7) (1970), which reads in part:

(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party *** and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending *** may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including *** (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial

⁴ Maintenance of confidentiality in the PTO is not premised on protection of trade secrets alone, but is designed to remove all impediments to early disclosure which would stem from an absence of confidentiality. Similarly, the power of a court to issue a protective order is not limited to protection of trade secrets, but encompasses removal of impediments to court access by parties as justice may require.

information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way ***.⁵

There is no substantive difference between proceedings held *in camera* under §145, and those held *in camera* under §141. Both extend the protection of the court to an applicant who has retained the subject matter of his application as a legitimate trade secret.

The analysis in *Kewanee, supra*, involved consideration of the purposes of the patent system, including disclosure of the invention in return for the limited term right of exclusion. That analysis was germane to the determination in our prior order that public disclosure of an appellant's trade secrets was not required in return for the right to appeal to this court and the consequent continuance of the quest for the patent right of exclusion.

Petitioner's solicitation and concern for the burdens upon this court, though laudable, are unfounded. Few appellants are in a position to present a proper case for sealing of the record. Many have commercialized their inventions prior to appeal; many will commercialize their inventions whatever the outcome of the appeal; and many have made their inventions known through publication. The subject matter of some inventions may become generally available through the activities of others. Those events, and others, may have rendered the involved information no longer susceptible of retention as a trade secret. Significantly, since January 1, 1974, when Rule 5.13(g) went into effect, there have been but two requests to seal the record.

Moreover, sealing of the record and oral argument *in camera* are exceptional actions, requiring strong

⁵ The reference to trade secrets and other confidential commercial information added by the 1970 amendments was intended to reflect existing law. Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendment to Rules.

justification. We do not share the view that Rule 5.13(g) opens a Pandora's box, or that virtually each and every appellant will move the court to take those actions if the present petition is not granted. To take counsel of those fears would require a jaundiced, and unwarranted, view that frivolous motions for *in camera* proceedings would proliferate. It would further pre-suppose an inability of this court to summarily reject those expectedly rare requests. That a rule of court, like Rule 5.13(g), may be subject to abuse does not justify abandonment of the rule.

Accordingly, the petition is *denied*.

**UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS
AND PATENT APPEALS**

IN THE MATTER OF THE Appeal No. 78-554.
APPLICATION
OF
CHIRANJIB K. SARKAR Serial No. 445, 765.

On motion to seal record
and for *in camera*
proceeding.

DECIDED: May 11, 1978

Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN, LANE,
and MILLER, Associate Judges.

O R D E R
PER CURIAM.

Appellant Sarkar moves the court pursuant to CCPA Rule 5.13(g) to seal the record in Appeal No. 78-554 and to hear oral argument with respect thereto *in camera* so that material disclosed in the involved patent application may be retained, in the event of an adverse decision, as a trade secret. Having considered memoranda stating the views of the parties, the motion is *granted*.

FACTS

February 13, 1978, Sarkar filed with the Clerk of this court the certified transcript of the proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) with respect to his pending patent application, which proceedings had culminated in an adverse decision of the Board of Appeals (board), on all pending claims, from which a timely appeal

had been taken under 35 USC 141. Sarkar's claimed invention involves a technique for "modeling" a river on a computer so that design requirements of riparian constructions can be accurately predicted. The board held that the claimed method embodying such a technique was not statutory subject matter under 35 USC 101 as construed in *Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). The controlling legal principles are, as yet, unsettled, and, at this time, the Supreme Court is again considering the status of computer-software inventions as statutory subject matter in *Parker v. Flook*, cert. granted, U.S. , 196 USPQ 864 (1978) (Appeal No. 77-642, argued April 25, 1978).

Concurrent with the filing of the transcript, Sarkar filed with the Clerk of this court the instant motion praying, *inter alia*, that the record be sealed. Upon receipt of these papers, the Clerk docketed Sarkar's appeal and took steps to preserve the secrecy of the materials contained in the transcript pending disposition of this motion. As a result, the papers constituting the record in this appeal have never been available to the public. Cf. *In re Mosher*, 45 CCPA 701, 248 F.2d 956, 115 USPQ 140 (1957). In the PTO, they were, presumably, held in confidence in accordance with 35 USC 122.

It is alleged that certain mathematical formulae involved in the claimed method have been retained as, and are now, valuable trade secrets, and it is argued that disclosure and attendant loss of such secrets in the course of obtaining judicial review of the PTO decision would be unjust. Attempts to enter into a stipulation with the PTO solicitor whereby an abbreviated record might have been brought publicly before this court have met with no success. Accordingly, relief has been sought under our Rule 5.13(g) which reads:

(g) *In Camera* Proceeding. In a proper case, where the interests of justice require, and

on a convincing showing thereof by motion properly made, the court will sit *in camera*, or seal its record, or both.

The PTO opposes the motion on public policy grounds, saying "A resolution, one way or the other, will have no effect on the Patent and Trademark Office," alleging that the showing made is insufficient to warrant the relief sought. The solicitor notes that Sarkar was granted a license under 35 USC 184 to file similar applications abroad and that Sarkar had failed to show that no foreign application filed thereunder was now open to the public. This court's decision in *In re Sackett*, 30 CCPA 1214, 136 F.2d 248, 57 USPQ 541 (1943), is cited for the proposition that the right of public access to court records is paramount to a patent applicant's claim to trade-secret rights.

In reply, Sarkar assures the court that no foreign applications have been filed and that there has been no public disclosure of the alleged trade secrets.

RESOLUTION

This is a case of first impression in this court with respect to which our prior decisions offer no guidance. *Sackett* does not support the proposition urged by the PTO. There, the appellant sought review of a board decision and, *after* the court's decision affirming the board had been rendered, moved the court to seal the record so that the substance of the patent application could be retained as a trade secret. The court denied the motion noting that once appellant had openly and voluntarily brought the alleged invention into the public forum of the court, the court was not (meaning no longer) authorized to protect it as a trade secret. Sarkar's concurrent filing of this motion and the certified transcript effectively avoids the *Sackett* problem.

Any federal court has the *inherent authority* to seal its record when, in the exercise of sound discretion, such action is deemed appropriate. See *Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.*, 46 U.S. L.W. 4320 (U.S. April 18, 1978) (Appeal No. 76-944). Our Rule 5.13(g) is merely declaratory of this inherent authority never before exercised by this court to protect a trade secret in an ex parte patent appeal.

The determination of what constitutes a "proper case" in which to seal our record requires balancing the triangular interests of the trade secret owner, the court as an institution, and the public. The factors present in this case which lead us to the conclusion that the motion should be granted are:

- (1) The substance of the patent application in issue has remained confidential by virtue of the operation of 35 USC 122;
- (2) The filing of the instant motion coincided with the filing of the certified transcript in this court such that the latter was never available to the public;
- (3) The motion and supporting memoranda convincingly demonstrate (a) that the application in issue contains material susceptible of retention as a trade secret, (b) that such material has, in fact, been so retained, (c) that appellant has filed no foreign patent applications, and (d) that the subject matter has not become generally available through the activities of others;
- (4) The merits of appellant's claim of entitlement to patent protection involve unsettled questions of law which are of current concern and the resolution of which is in the public interest;
- (5) All less restrictive mechanisms for bringing the dispute before this court while still protecting the

alleged trade secrets, e.g., a stipulated statement of facts, an abbreviated record, etc., have been explored and proven impractical; and

(6) The extraordinary action of the court in protecting the substance of the pending application will not be rendered nugatory by the issuance of a patent *regardless* of our holding since there are no allowed claims based on the alleged trade secret pending in Sarkar's application.

We are guided in our determination by the opinion of the Supreme Court in *Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.*, 416 U.S. 470, 181 USPQ 673 (1974), from which we glean the sentiment that, wherever possible, trade secret law and patent law should be administered in such manner that the former will not deter an inventor from seeking the benefit of the latter, because the public is *most* benefited by the early disclosure of the invention in consideration of the patent grant. If a patent applicant is unwilling to pursue his right to a patent at the risk of certain loss of trade secret protection, the two systems will conflict, the public will be deprived of knowledge of the invention in many cases, and inventors will be reluctant to bring unsettled legal questions of significant current interest before this court for resolution. By extending the protection of the court to the *legitimate* trade secret under conditions such as those outlined above, we believe that conflicts between the two systems will be minimized.

It is, therefore, ORDERED that the MOTION FOR *IN CAMERA* PROCEEDINGS and TO SEAL THE RECORD is *granted* to the extent that the record, briefs, and other papers in this appeal shall remain confidential and only the parties to this appeal, their counsel, and necessary court personnel shall be permitted to be present at any oral argument. The court reserves the right to articulate the bases of its decision as it deems necessary.

GRANTED

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS**

IN RE MOTION BY
ELLSWORTH H. MOSHER Special C.C.P.A. Docket No.

**MOTION UNDER RULE 5.3 TO VACATE OR
OVERRULE *In re Sarkar* DECIDED May 11, 1978,
OR FOR OTHER RELIEF**

To the Honorable, the Chief
Judge and the Associate
Judges of the United
States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals:

Now comes ELLSWORTH H. MOSHER, a member in good standing of the Bar of this Court, and respectfully moves the Court for an Order vacating or overruling the decision of the Court dated May 11, 1978, by which the record, etc., in the case of *In re Sarkar*, C.C.P.A. Docket No. 78-554, was sealed, so that the undersigned may thereafter secure copies of portions of the record therein.

Alternatively, the undersigned respectfully moves the Court for an Order modifying the aforesaid decision in *Sarkar* at least to the extent of

- (a) authorizing the undersigned to be present during the oral argument in *Sarkar*, and
- (b) instructing the Clerk of the Court to give the undersigned reasonable notice in advance of the date set for the oral hearing in *Sarkar*.

A supporting brief and the docketing fee of fifty dollars (\$50.00) are attached hereto, as well as appropriate Orders.

Respectfully submitted,

Ellsworth H. Mosher
1911 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 600, Crystal Mall 1
Arlington, Virginia 22202
Telephone (703) 920-8900

June 8, 1978

STATEMENT IN LIEU OF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

It is appreciated that Rule 5.3 requires that a motion of this kind be served on the opposing party. However, since not only the record but also the briefs in *Sarkar* have been sealed, the undersigned has no knowledge of the address of *Sarkar* or his counsel. Accordingly, extra copies of this motion (with supporting brief and orders) are attached hereto so that the Clerk of the Court may, if he be so advised, serve copies on the appropriate individuals.

Ellsworth H. Mosher

**THE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
RULE OF COURT PROVISIONS INVOLVED**

In pertinent part, the constitutional provisions involved here are the following:

From the First Amendment:

Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;...

From the Fifth Amendment:

No person shall... be deprived of... liberty... without due process of law...

From the Ninth Amendment:

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

From the Tenth Amendment:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The statutory provisions are the following:

From the Act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 117, §16:

§ 16. And be it further enacted, That whenever there shall be two interfering patents, or whenever a patent on application shall have been refused on an adverse decision of a board of examiners, on the ground that the patent applied for would interfere with an unexpired patent previously granted, any person interested in such patent, either by assignment or otherwise, in the one case, and any such applicant in the other case, may have remedy by bill in equity;...

[LETTERHEAD]

June 8, 1978

Clerk
United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals
717 Madison Place, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Re: In re Sarkar—C.C.P.A. Docket No. 78-554

Sir:

Please provide the undersigned with a certified copy of the appellant's application as filed, from the record in the above-identified appeal. A certified check in the sum of fifty dollars (\$50.00) is attached hereto to cover the cost of the certified copy.

CAUTION: This order for certified copies must not, and cannot, be filled unless and until the Court vacates or overrules the Order of May 11, 1978 sealing the record in *Sarkar*.

Respectfully submitted,

ELLSWORTH H. MOSHER

EHM:mmh
Enclosure

From the Act of March 3, 1839, 5 Stat. 353, §11:

§ 11. And be it further enacted, That in all cases where an appeal is now allowed by law from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents to a board of examiners, provided for in the seventh section of the act to which this is additional, the party, instead thereof, shall have a right to appeal to the Chief Justice of the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia, by giving notice thereof to the Commissioner, and filing in the Patent Office, within such time as the Commissioner shall appoint, his reasons of appeal specifically set forth in writing, and also paying into the Patent Office, to the credit of the patent fund, the sum of twenty-five dollars. And it shall be the duty of said Chief Justice, on petition, to hear and determine all such appeals, and to revise such decisions in a summary way, on the evidence produced before the Commissioner, at such early and convenient time as he may appoint,...

From the Act of March 2, 1929, Public No. 914, 70th Congress, §2.(a):

§ 2.(a) The jurisdiction now vested in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in respect of appeals from the Patent Office in patent and trademark cases is vested in the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.

28 U.S.C. §211. Appointment and number of judges

The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a chief judge and four associate judges who shall constitute a court of record known as the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Such court is hereby declared to be a court established under article III of the Constitution of the United States. As amended Aug. 25, 1958, Pub.L. 85-755, §1, 72 Stat. 848.

28 U.S.C. §1256: Court of Customs and Patent Appeals; certiorari

Cases in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 928

28 U.S.C. §2071: Rule-making power generally

The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 961; May 24, 1949, c. 139, §102, 63 Stat. 104.

35 U.S.C. §122: Confidential status of applications

Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of the applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner. As amended Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-596, §1, 88 Stat. 1949.

35 U.S.C. §§141-144:

§141. Appeal to Court of Customs and Patent Appeals

An applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Appeals may appeal to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, thereby waiving his right to proceed under section 145 of this title. A party to an interference dissatisfied with the decision of the board of patent interferences on the question of priority may appeal to the United States court of Customs and Patent appeals, but such appeal shall be dismissed if any adverse party to such

interference, within twenty days after the appellant has filed notice of appeal according to section 142 of this title, files notice with the Commissioner that he elects to have all further proceedings conducted as provided in section 146 of this title. Thereupon the appellant shall have thirty days thereafter within which to file a civil action under section 146, in default of which the decision appealed from shall govern the further proceedings in the case. July 19, 1952, c. 950, §1, 66 Stat. 802.

§142. Notice of Appeal

When an appeal is taken to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the appellant shall give notice thereof to the Commissioner, and shall file in the Patent and Trademark Office his reasons of appeal, specifically set forth in writing, within such time after the date of the decision appealed from, not less than sixty days, as the Commissioner appoints. As amended Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-596, §1, 88 Stat. 1949.

§143. Proceedings on appeal

The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals shall, before hearing such appeal, give notice of the time and place of the hearing to the Commissioner and the parties thereto. The Commissioner shall transmit to the court certified copies of all the necessary original papers and evidence in the case specified by the appellant and any additional papers and evidence specified by the appellee and in an ex parte case the Commissioner shall furnish the court with the grounds of the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office, in writing, touching all the points involved by the reasons of appeal. As amended Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-596, §1, 88 Stat. 1949.

§ 144. Decision on appeal

The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, on petition, shall hear and determine such appeal on the evidence produced before the Patent and Trademark Office, and the decision shall be confined to the points set forth in the reasons of appeal. Upon its determination the court shall return to the Commissioner a certificate of its proceedings and decision, which shall be entered of record in the Patent and Trademark Office and govern the further proceedings in the case.

As amended Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-596, §1, 8 Stat. 1949.

The court rules involved are the following:

C.C.P.A. Rule 1.2(b):

"Records. The clerk shall have custody of the records of the court . . . Any person may, except where restricted by law or where the court otherwise directs, have access to such records [see 28 U.S.C. 2637]. Copies thereof may be obtained on payment of prescribed fees set by the court."

C.C.P.A. Rule 5.13(g):

"*In Camera* Proceedings. In a proper case, where the interests of justice require, and on a convincing showing thereof by a motion properly made, the court will sit *in camera*, or seal its record, or both."

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS

IN RE PETITION OF
ELLSWORTH H. MOSHER

**MOTION FOR A STAY OF FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IN *IN RE SARKAR***

To the Honorable, the Chief
Judge and the Associate
Judges of the United
States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals:

Now comes your petitioner, Ellsworth H. MOSHER, and respectfully moves for a stay of further proceedings in this Court in the matter of *In re Sarkar*, Appeal No. 78-554. Petitioner is now preparing a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States to review this Court's decision in *In re Mosher*, F.2d , 199 U.S.P.Q. 82 (1978), relative to the correctness of sealing the record in *Sarkar* and in ordering an *in camera* oral hearing in the appeal therein, and is filing the instant motion in order to stay further proceedings in *Sarkar* (thereby preserving the *status quo*) pending a decision of the Supreme Court on the petition for certiorari.

It is respectfully submitted that this Court should take no further action in *Sarkar* that might risk mootng what petitioner believes to be either of his two rights asserted in his original petition—rights which he is still entitled to pursue via timely petition for certiorari—and which further action by this Court might place beyond the power even of the Supreme Court fully to vindicate in the event that Court should agree with petitioner's position.

Early and favorable action on this motion is earnestly solicited. Since this Court declined to serve the original petition upon the parties (F.2d , 199 U.S.P.Q. at 83, footnote 1) it is assumed that despite Rule 6.2 this motion likewise need not be served, since no mandate was issued.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles A. Wendel

Harold C. Wegner

Attorneys for Petitioner
 1911 Jefferson Davis Highway
 Suite 600, Crystal Mall 1
 Arlington, Virginia 22202
 Telephone (703) 920-8900

November 1, 1978

UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS
 717 MADISON PLACE NW.
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20439

GEORGE E. HUTCHINSON
 CLERK

TELEPHONE: 347-1552
 AREA CODE 202

November 2, 1978

Mr. Charles A. Wendel
 Stevens, Davis, Miller and Mosher
 1911 Jefferson Davis Highway
 Arlington, Va. 22202

Re: In the Matter of the Petition of Ellsworth H.
 Mosher

Dear Sir:

The court today denied the motion of Ellsworth H. Mosher for a stay of further proceedings in this court in *In re Sarkar*, Appeal No. 78-554.

FOR THE COURT

Clerk

m
 CC: Mr. Harold Wegner

**THE AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENTS RELIED UPON
BY THE COURT BELOW**

In granting and then later sustaining the original ruling on Sarkar's motion, it appears (App. 4b) that considerable reliance was placed upon *Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.*, U.S. , 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). However, Mr. Justice Powell's opinion for the majority points out that the respondents wished to copy certain of the Watergate tapes "for broadcasting and sale to the public" (55 L.Ed.2d at 575). The majority opinion (at page 577) makes it clear that the tapes had already been "played for the jury and the public in the courtroom". The District Court had

"furnished the jurors, reporters, and members of the public in attendance with earphones and with transcripts prepared by the Special Prosecutor" [Emphasis added].

Although the transcripts themselves had not been admitted in evidence, the Court pointed out that these had been "widely reprinted in the press".

Therefore—unlike the situation in *Sarkar*—the subject matter of the Watergate tapes had *already* been widely disseminated to the public, and so the only question remaining was whether for purely commercial reasons the respondents should be permitted to "copy, broadcast, and sell to the public the portions of the tapes *played at trial*" [emphasis added].

Sealing of the record, in the sense of the present petition, simply was not an element of the *Nixon* case.

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), was relied upon by the court below (App. 5b), but the facts of that case are not such as to render it of much value as a

guide in the present situation. *Kewanee* was a simple case of trade secret *misappropriation* to which was super-added the question of whether Ohio state trade secret protection was pre-empted by operation of the federal patent law (416 U.S. at 472). No such considerations are present here, where there are no questions of trade secret misappropriation or pre-emption of the laws of one governmental entity (Ohio) by the laws of another governmental entity (the United States).

In P.J. Federico's *Commentary on the New Patent Act*, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 et seq. (1954), he notes at page 5 that

"[f]rom 1874 to 1952 over sixty Acts of Congress relating to patents have been passed; . . ."

This shows that the Congress has had ample *opportunity* over the years to express a different intent as to secrecy of court records in the C.C.P.A., had it wished to do so. If anything, therefore, petitioner's position is *fortified* rather than otherwise by *Kewanee*. See the passage, at page 493 of 416 U.S., reading as follows:

"Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection. Until Congress takes affirmative action to the contrary, States should be free to grant protection to trade secrets." [Emphasis added]

Transposing this principle to the present case, and since (as noted by Federico) the Congress has seen fit to amend and/or revise the patent laws in other respects dozens of times over the last century without once¹ expressing any

¹ Of course secrecy is provided for in other contexts having nothing to do with the present case. See 35 U.S.C. §181 relative to patent applications for inventions involving the *national security*, and §184 on the requirements for licensing for *foreign filing* on inventions made in the United States. Although the contexts in those situations are

(footnote continued)

legislative intent with respect to secrecy of patent applications *except* while they remain within the Patent Office (35 U.S.C. §122), the conclusion seems inescapable that the Congress "by its silence over these many years" adheres to the wisdom of continuing to allow the records in the files of the C.C.P.A. in a direct appeal from the Patent Office to be freely available to the public, as they always have been in the past.

The citation by the C.C.P.A. (App. 3a) of the Sixth Circuit case of *A. O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co.*, 73 F.2d 531 (6 Cir., 1934), does not support the denial of access to court records, etc., in the C.C.P.A. That case was nothing more or less than an ordinary patent infringement and trade secrets case. It has nothing whatsoever to do with proceedings on the part of a patent applicant *hoping ultimately to obtain a patent*.

Petitioner makes no contention that the sealing of the record in an ordinary garden variety patent infringement and trade secrets case is improper, so far as trade secrets *per se* are concerned. The gravamen of the action in such a case is different in kind from that involved in the present petition because it does not—and can not—include an attempt to *obtain a patent*.

Similar remarks apply to the citation by the C.C.P.A. (App. 3a) of *Jelke and O'Neill*, both state cases. *People v. Jelke*, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1959), was a case where in order to "protect" a witness in a case involving obscene and sordid details, the trial judge closed the trial to the public during the People's case but opened it to the public during the defense. It had nothing to do with trade

(footnote continued)

entirely different, the very fact that the Congress included those additional secrecy provisions in the Patent Act of 1952 still further fortifies petitioner's contention that the *absence* of any comparable provisions in §§141-144 should be regarded as significant—and indeed controlling here.

secrets. The state court there pointed out an important distinction in cases of this general character:

"There is, however, a vast difference between a trial of that kind, to which *everyone is admitted except* a designated few, and one, as in the case before us, from which *everyone is excluded but* a limited class." [Emphasis in the original] (p. 774 of 123 N.E.2d).

State [ex. rel. Ampco Metal, Inc.] v. O'Neill, 273 Wisc. 530, 78 N.W.2d 921 (1956), was a quite ordinary trade secrets case in a state court with of course no aspect of an attempt to obtain a patent.

The reference to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the opinion of the C.C.P.A. (App. 4a) is "inapposite". In *United States v. Torch Manufacturing Co., Inc.*, 509 F.2d 1187 (1975), the C.C.P.A. itself noted at page 1192, footnote 8, that

"[a]ppellee's citation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is *inapposite* inasmuch as they are expressly made applicable to the United States district courts only." [Emphasis added]

The C.C.P.A. made some point of the fact that §122 of the new Patent Act and §§141-144 are in different "chapters" of the Patent Act of 1952 (App. 3a). However, this overlooks the fact that the Patent Act of 1952 was enacted as an *entirety*.² As stated at 82 C.J.S. pp. 694-698 (omitting footnotes):

"All parts, provisions, or sections of a statute or section, must be read, considered, or construed together, and each must be considered with respect to, or in the light of, all the other provisions or sections, and construed in connection, or har-

² See Federico, *Commentary*, supra, at page 9.

mony, with the whole. So, in determining the meaning of a particular word, phrase, or clause as used in a statute, *the entire statute is to be considered.*" [Emphasis added]

That same authority also states (pages 691-3) that,

"In the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, a statute must, or should, be read or construed as a whole, or in its entirety, and, *with respect to the construction of a statute, its division into sections is a purely artificial and unessential arrangement.*" [Emphasis added.]

Finally, the C.C.P.A. (App. 5a) remarked on the fact that since its Rule 5.13(g) went into effect nearly five years ago, only two requests to seal the record have been made. However if, as petitioner respectfully contends earlier, the C.C.P.A. has no *authority* to seal its records, etc., it is quite immaterial whether there are only two such instances or whether they number in the hundreds. Moreover, so far as the implied ability of the C.C.P.A. to control the situation³ by the proper exercise of *discretion* under its Rule 5.13(g) is concerned, petitioner's high regard for the court below makes it easy for him to concede the point if the point were relevant. The relevant point at issue here is not the lower court's discretion, but its *authority*. Stated plainly and simply, petitioner contends that the C.C.P.A. does not have the necessary authority.

³ *Quare:* Speaking of control, how could the court below ever justify a denial of a motion to seal, etc., presented in the future by *each* of appellants A, B, C, . . . X, Y, Z based solely upon a mere showing of the presence of trade secrets in their respective patent applications, but without any showing of special circumstances *other* than trade secrecy? Would not a denial under such circumstances be a constitutionally impermissible discriminatory action forbidden by the Fifth Amendment?

DEC 15 1978

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

MICHAEL B. OAK, JR., CLERK

No. 78-826

ELLSWORTH H. MOSHER,

*Petitioner**v.*

HON. HOWARD T. MARKEY

HON. GILES S. RICH

HON. PHILLIP B. BALDWIN

HON. DONALD E. LANE

HON. JACK R. MILLER

The Chief Judge and the Associate
Judges of the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals

and

CHIRANJIB K. SARKAR,

Respondents

RULE 24(5) SUPPLEMENT TO
"PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS"

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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-826

ELLSWORTH H. MOSHER,
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v.

HON. HOWARD T. MARKEY
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The Chief Judge and the Associate
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**RULE 24(5) SUPPLEMENT TO
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OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS"**

Since this petition was filed, the C.C.P.A. has handed down its decision *on the merits* in *Sarkar* (slipsheet opinion dated December 7, 1978). The court affirmed the Patent Office rejection of all of *Sarkar*'s claims.

Although Sarkar has 21 days within which to petition for rehearing (C.C.P.A. Rule 6.1) and 90 days within which to petition for certiorari to this Court, it is anticipated that Sarkar in the case at bar probably will urge dismissal of this petition because of alleged mootness.

The decision adverse to Sarkar on the merits does not moot the important public interest question presented by this petition. It is well settled that where a substantial question involving the public interest is likely to be a *recurring* one, the fact that in the particular case under consideration events may have rendered moot any possible relief as to the particular parties is not sufficient to deprive the Court of jurisdiction because of alleged mootness. For example, see *Moore v. Ogilvie*, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) at 816, and *Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle*, 416 U.S. 115 (1974) at 125-6.

Rule 5.13(g) still remains on the books. It seems quite clear from the following excerpt from the lower court's opinion at App. 6-a:

"We do not share the view that Rule 5.13(g) opens a Pandora's box, or that virtually each and every appellant will move the court to take those actions if the present petition is not granted. To take counsel of those fears would require a jaundiced, and unwarranted, view that frivolous motions for *in camera* proceedings would proliferate. It would further pre-suppose an inability of this court to summarily reject those expectedly rare requests. That a rule of court, like Rule 5.13(g), may be subject to abuse does not justify abandonment of the rule."

that the court will continue to entertain motions for a closure order in direct appeals from the Patent Office. This therefore is the "continuing and brooding presence"

so aptly characterized by this Court in *Super Tire* (416 U.S. at 122).

As stated later in *Super Tire*,

"It is sufficient, therefore, that the litigant show the existence of an immediate and definite governmental action or policy that has adversely affected and continues to affect a present interest." (416 U.S. at 125-6)

and

"The important ingredient in these cases was governmental action directly affecting, and continuing to affect, the behavior of citizens in our society." (416 U.S. at 126)

By tests such as these, petitioner is entitled to have this Court pass upon the important public question presented by the petition herein, despite the lower court's intervening ruling on the merits in Sarkar's appeal. The danger to which the petition is addressed still persists, and this Court should grant certiorari in order to resolve it.

Respectfully submitted,

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December 1978

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED

No. 78-826

JAN 10 1979

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

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STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS,
ET AL.

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND
PATENT APPEALS*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
RESPONDENT JUDGES IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-826

ELLSWORTH H. MOSHER, PETITIONER

v.

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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND
PATENT APPEALS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
RESPONDENT JUDGES IN OPPOSITION

Petitioner seeks review of a decision by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) to seal the record in the case of *In re Sarkar*, CCPA Docket No. 78-554.

Petitioner was not a party to the *Sarkar* appeal and concedes that he "is in no way connected with Sarkar, either directly or indirectly, and has no interest (commercial or otherwise) in the particular subject matter involved in Sarkar's appeal" (Pet. 5).

1. Sarkar appealed to the CCPA the denial of a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals, and moved to seal the record under CCPA Rule 5.13(g)¹

¹"In a proper case, where the interests of justice require, and on a convincing showing thereof by motion properly made, the court will sit *in camera*, or seal its record, or both."

so that, in the event of an adverse decision, he could continue to protect the material involved as a trade secret. The CCPA granted the motion and ordered the record sealed.²

Petitioner then moved to vacate the CCPA's order, alleging only that he is a member of the CCPA bar who desires access to the record in the *Sarkar* case (Pet. App. 1-c to 2-c) and that the decision is invalid because it conflicts with the public's right of access to court records. Petitioner did not seek to intervene in the *Sarkar* case. Treating the motion as a petition, and assuming for purposes of the petition that petitioner had standing to challenge the order to seal the record (Pet. App. 2-a), CCPA denied the petition. The CCPA subsequently denied petitioner's application to stay further proceedings in *Sarkar* (Pet. App. 1-f). On November 28, 1978, the Chief Justice denied petitioner's application (No. A-490) to stay the CCPA proceedings. On December 7, 1978, the CCPA affirmed the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals denying *Sarkar* a patent.

2. Review by this Court is unwarranted. Petitioner was not a party to the case in the CCPA and has never sought to intervene in that court or this. By his own admission he "has no interest * * * in the particular subject matter involved in *Sarkar's* appeal" (Pet. 5). Accordingly, he is not entitled to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. See *Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board of Trade*, 222 U.S. 578, 581 (1911); R. Stern & E. Gressman, *Supreme Court Practice* 433 (5th ed. 1978).³ This petition does not

present a rare or unusual situation that would warrant this Court's permitting petitioner to seek certiorari despite his nonparty status in the proceeding below.⁴

Although the CCPA assumed that petitioner had standing to challenge its authority to seal a record, that assumption would not confer on this Court the power to adjudicate the case. Under this Court's settled law of standing, petitioner lacks the requisite concrete injury in fact to give him standing. Petitioner's allegation amounts to no more than an "abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by an adjudication" that "does not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art. III." *Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization*, 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976).

In any event, the CCPA's order sealing the record in *Sarkar* is entirely within its authority to protect litigants' trade secrets. The common law right of access to judicial records is not absolute, as this Court recognized in *Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978), and CCPA here exercised its authority to seal the record to protect trade secrets should the patent ultimately be denied (as it was). Cf. *Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.*, 416 U.S. 470 (1974).

Rule 5.13(g) is merely CCPA's analogue to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7), which authorizes district courts to issue "any order which justice requires" to protect trade secrets. Furthermore, patent applications are kept confidential by the Patent and Trademark Office, 35 U.S.C. 122, and it would be anomalous to force an applicant to take the risk that he will forfeit this confidentiality if he invokes his right to judicial review and the CCPA concludes that the discovery is not patentable.

²The CCPA's order is reported at 575 F. 2d 870 (C.C.P.A. 1978).

³28 U.S.C. 1254 explicitly limits to "parties" the persons who may file petitions for certiorari to seek review of judgments of the courts of appeals. Although 28 U.S.C. 1256, which governs review of CCPA decisions, does not contain a similar explicit reference, there is no reason to believe that Congress intended the practice to be different.

⁴Cf. *Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n*, 390 U.S. 459 (1968), 389 U.S. 813 (1967), granting a petition to intervene and petition for certiorari filed by a person who was not a party in the court of appeals.

The CCPA recognized that its rule would be invoked in only a few cases and that applicants would be successful in even fewer (Pet. App. 5-a). Indeed, the CCPA noted that since Rule 5.13(g) went into effect in January 1974, there had been only two requests to seal records (*ibid.*); *Sarkar* was apparently the first time such a request was granted (Pet. App. 4-b). The CCPA thus has exercised its authority to protect litigants' rights in a reasonable manner, balancing the public's right of access against *Sarkar*'s right to trade secret protection.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

WADE H. McCREE, JR.
Solicitor General

JANUARY 1979

DEC 4 1978

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

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*The Chief Judge and the Associate
Judges of the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals*

and

CHIRANJIB K. SARKAR,
Respondents

—
**BRIEF OF DR. C. K. SARKAR (SARKAR)
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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HON. JACK R. MILLER*The Chief Judge and the Associate
Judges of the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals*

and

CHIRANJIB K. SARKAR,
RespondentsBRIEF OF DR. C. K. SARKAR (SARKAR)
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondent, Sarkar, files the following Brief in opposition to Respondents' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Dr. C. K. Sarkar through his licensee, Tri-County Engineering Co. of Naples, Florida, filed a patent application several years ago in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The application fully discloses this invention as is required by 35 U.S.C. 112. Certain valuable trade secrets of necessity, therefore, are disclosed. Like all other pending applications, the PTO continues to hold Sarkar's application in confidence under 35 U.S.C. 122.

The invention recited in the Sarkar application has been found by the PTO to be useful, novel and nonobvious. Indeed, it constitutes a major breakthrough in the technology to which it relates. Normally, such a finding by the PTO would result in the issuance of a patent. *Graham v. John Deere*, 383 U.S. 1, 15 L Ed 2d 545, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).

The PTO, however, has refused to issue a patent on the grounds that the invention falls outside the scope of the statutory subject matter prescribed in 35 U.S.C. 101. *Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972); *Parker v. Flook*, 437 U.S. —, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978). The correctness of this position is the sole issue in Sarkar's appeal now before the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA).

To protect his valuable and novel trade secrets from destruction when seeking his right of appeal (35 U.S.C. 142) on an issue of law fraught with controversy, Sarkar moved the CCPA upon initiation of his appeal to hold his case *in camera*. Based upon a finding of special facts and circumstances indigenous to the Sarkar case, the CCPA granted Sarkar's motion. *In re Sarkar*, 575 F. 2d 870, 197 U.S.P.Q. 788 (CCPA, 1978). The PTO, as the public's lawful defender and appellee in *Sarkar* chose not to seek review of the CCPA's decision.

In reliance upon the finalization of the CCPA's decision to hold the case *in camera*, Sarkar perfected his appeal, which of necessity meant making of record his trade secrets.

Thereafter, by third party proceeding of which Sarkar had no notice, Petitioner sought access to Sarkar's record and thus, his trade secrets. Access was refused by the CCPA. *In re Mosher*, 199 U.S.P.Q. 82 (CCPA, 1978).

Petitioner seeks a review by certiorari of *Mosher*, *supra*. and has, for the first time, named Sarkar as a party, thus attempting to now bring Sarkar's record before this Court.

ARGUMENT

Summary

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied because:

- 1) This case gives rise to no major issue of or conflict in the law, it being one decided on its specific facts.
- 2) The Petition is needless, premature and moot as to Sarkar's case.
- 3) The granting of the Petition could materially prejudice the public interest.
- 4) Petitioner's admissions render his Petition dismissable as to Sarkar's case.
- 5) A mere cursory review of the CCPA's decisions shows them to be correct and not in need of review.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

This Case Gives Rise To No Major Issues of or Conflict In the Law, It Being One Decided On Its Specific Facts.

The decisions of the CCPA in *Sarkar*, and *Mosher*, *supra*., speak for themselves and are reprinted in the Petition at pg. 1-b et seq. The cases turn on the specific circumstances and facts indigenous to the *Sarkar* case. The CCPA merely invoked the classic, inherent and often used powers of any Article III Court. Its Rule 5.13(g) is merely a proper reflection of this inherent power. Federal courts for many years, for example, have protected trade secrets in patent litigation. *Moore's Federal Practice*, Vol. 4A pg. 34-110, § 34.19[2] fn 21-22.

Petitioner's attempt to raise the spector of major issues are nothing but false clouds. The openness of Federal Court records has never been absolute. If anything, Petitioner, rather than the CCPA, seeks to overturn "139 years" of this doctrine, recently affirmed not just in *Sarkar*, but in *Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.*, 46 U.S.L.W. 4320 (1978).

The public's interest at all times in the *Sarkar* case was fully represented by its lawful designate, the PTO. Within the constraints, then, of 35 U.S.C. 122, the public via its representative, the PTO, had full access to all files, records and proceedings—and fully participated therein. Fairness was always present and the protective order was no broader than needed to do substantial justice.

None of the reasons, expressed or implied, within Rule 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States for granting certiorari are present in this case. The Petition should therefore be dismissed.

The Petition is Needless, Premature and Moot ~~As~~ To Sarkar's Case.

The CCPA is well advanced in deciding the *Sarkar* case on its merits. An oral hearing was held on October 5, 1978, almost a month and a half before this Petition was filed. Even assuming the correctness of Petitioner's erroneous legal contentions, he had no right other than to be a mere spectator at the hearing. Given the current backlog of the CCPA, a decision is imminent.

If the CCPA decides the *Sarkar* case in favor of *Sarkar*, and no review is sought by the PTO, the *Sarkar* patent will issue shortly thereafter, pending some totally unexpected circumstance. The issuance of the patent makes public the entire record, thus rendering the Petition moot.

If the CCPA's decision is adverse to *Sarkar*, or for some other reason the patent does not issue, Petitioner, who disavows any interest in *Sarkar*'s subject matter (pet. pg. 5), can make no showing why he should be able to destroy *Sarkar*'s valuable trade secrets by entrance into the case. 35 U.S.C. 122. Thus, no access to *Sarkar*'s subject matter will be allowed anyway.

The Petition is therefore needless, premature and moot as to *Sarkar*'s case.

As to Petitioner's generic attack on CCPA Rule 5.13(g) itself, under the *In re Mosher* case, *supra*., *Sarkar* is not a party thereto and has no standing to address the issues therein. The Petition, however, should be dismissed at least as to the *Sarkar* case.

The Granting of the Petition Could Materially Prejudice the Public Interest

The CCPA's decision in *Sarkar*, *supra*. enabled *Sarkar* to seek judicial review of an area of the law about which there is much need for clarification, by way of lower

court interpretation of the recent decisions of this Court in *Benson* and *Flook*, *supra*. The granting of this Petition would further deter others from seeking judicial review and thus, further clarification. Clearly, this is not in the public interest.

It is undeniable that if this Petition were granted as to the *Sarkar* case, the appellate process on the merits of *Sarkar*'s application would have to stop. This delay could well cause the delay of the issuance of the patent and thus, the lawful dedication of the trade secret rights to the public by disclosure. *Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp.*, 416 U.S. 470, 181 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1974). Progress in the useful arts would be hindered. Such is clearly not in the public interest (Art. I, Sect. 8, U.S. Const.).

Furthermore, if this Petition were granted, the CCPA record would be sent to the U.S. Supreme Court. This, in turn, would necessitate *Sarkar*'s filing a motion for this Court to hear the case *in camera*. A further delay will then occur while this Court considers whether it has the power to do what the CCPA did. Again, the public interest is hurt.

In addition, the effect that a granting of this Petition would have on current appellate practice would be significant and detrimental to the public interest. The mere granting of this Petition, it is respectfully submitted would give rise to a question as to whether any non-party, third person (such as Petitioner) could usurp the function of the PTO and collaterally attack, by mere petition, any decision of the CCPA. A flood of petitions could deluge the CCPA. Inventors having valuable trade secrets would be reluctant to file applications and thus, anti-social behavior encouraged. *Kewanee*, *supra*. The CCPA's processes could be slowed to a crawl awaiting the outcome of this Court's ultimate decision before deciding any other petition filed. Cases already decided would be thrown open at any time to outside collateral attack, and

the uncertainty of the strength of issued patents thrown into further doubt. No public interest would be served by granting this petition.

It is also respectfully submitted that the prejudice to *Sarkar* if the petition were granted would be unwarranted and not in the public interest. *Sarkar* is a member of the public. He seeks to give to other members of the public, through the patent system, something they clearly did not have before *Sarkar* invented it. The granting of this petition with its eventual delay and cost to *Sarkar* who relied upon the due process offered him by the PTO and CCPA, would not be just or fair to him and thus to the public.

**Petitioner's Admissions Render His Petition Dismissable
As To *Sarkar*'s Case**

Petitioner is admittedly, a practicing patent attorney and partner in a law firm in Washington, D.C. which represents many corporate clients who could conceivably stand to benefit materially from a destruction of *Sarkar*'s trade secret rights. Petitioner tacitly admits that he does not know the subject matter of *Sarkar*'s application for if he did, his case would be moot.

Petitioner admits on pg. 5 of the Petition that he "has no interest (commercial or otherwise) in the particular subject matter involved in *Sarkar*'s appeal". Simultaneously, he joins *Sarkar* as a Respondent so that Petitioner may have access to *Sarkar*'s trade secrets if he wins his case in this Court.

If Petitioner has no interest in *Sarkar*'s file, his attack is merely a generic one on the *Mosher* decision and thus raises issues only as to the future handling of cases after *Sarkar*'s. Since *Sarkar* is not involved, the Petition should be dismissed as to *Sarkar*'s case.

It is to be pointed out that Sarkar was clearly denied due process by Petitioner's admitted failure to serve his CCPA papers on Sarkar. Petitioner's excuse for this failure (pet. 3-c) is feeble, since he was able to serve this Petition on Sarkar's attorney of record.

By his own admissions then, the *Sarkar* case is not a part of Petitioner's alleged cause, case or controversy and his petition to the extent it seeks access to Sarkar's record should be dismissed.

A Mere Cursory Review of the CCPA's Decisions Shows Them To Be Correct and Not In Need of Review

The decisions in *Sarkar* and *Mosher*, *supra*, are short, clear, and correct—a fact evident from a mere cursory review thereof. Petitioner, whose standing is anything but clear, constitutes nothing more than a single member of the public seeking to usurp a function of the public's duly appointed representative, the PTO. In this case, there is not one scintilla of evidence, nor any allegation that the PTO did not fully and honorably uphold its full duty to the public. On behalf of the public it chose not to seek review. In reliance thereon, the CCPA, the PTO and Sarkar went forward in good faith with Sarkar's appeal. It would ill-behoove this Court to open itself up to a flood of petitions by anyone who may collaterally seek to question, not just the CCPA, but the PTO as well, and who could destroy valuable property rights without due notice, in the process.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

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December, 1978

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED

JAN 23 1979

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

MEYER, JR., CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-826

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Petitioner

v.

HON. HOWARD T. MARKEY

HON. GILES S. RICH

HON. PHILLIP B. BALDWIN

HON. DONALD E. LANE

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The Chief Judge and the Associate
Judges of the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals

and

CHIRANJIB K. SARKAR,
Respondents

**PETITIONERS REPLY
UNDER RULE 24(4) TO
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
RESPONDANT JUDGES**

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January, 1979

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**PETITIONERS REPLY
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I. PETITIONER HAS STANDING IN THIS COURT

The respondent judges suggest that petitioner lacks
standing to file his petition for certiorari. Petitioner's
right (and standing) to file a petition for certiorari is not

based upon whether he intervened in the Sarkar appeal and asked for consideration of the merits in that case, but rather from the denial of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals of *his own petition* for access to the court record and for attendance at the oral hearing. More is involved here than "an abstract concern with a subject that could be effected by an adjudication" and does result in a "concrete injury required by Art. III" because the action complained of here (and forming the basis for the petition) was the denial of petitioner's motion in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (1) to have the *Sarkar* record opened and (2) to permit petitioner to attend the oral hearing. No ruling was sought seeking to intervene and present arguments involving the *merits* of the Sarkar case.

The concern over jurisdiction in this Court is wholly unfounded. The memorandum for the respondent judges overlooks the fact that petitioner here is seeking relief from the lower court's denial of a request *by petitioner* for access to copies of the lower court records which, in direct appeals from the Patent Office, have *always* been available for inspection and copying by anyone up until May of last year. If there should be any doubt as to this Court's jurisdiction under the plain words of 28 U.S.C. §1256, it would be dispelled by the old case of *Boyden v. Burke* [*Commissioner of Patents*], 14 How. (55 U.S.) 575, where as long ago as 1852 this Court intervened on behalf of a person seeking copies of public records, and in effect, supported the right of access. As stated at 14 How. at page 583:

"These records being in the care and custody of the Commissioner of Patents, it is his duty to give authenticated copies to any person who shall demand the same, as soon as he conveniently can, on payment of the legal fees."

If for "Commissioner of Patents" we read *C.C.P.A.*, we have to all intents and purposes the present case.

Petitioner did not participate in the proceeding below as a "non-party". Indeed, he was not permitted to participate in any way due to the action of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and it is this action by the CCPA which forms the basis of this petition.

II. THE ACTION COMPLAINED OF SHOULD BE REDRESSED IN THIS COURT

Petitioner has never sought to intervene as a *party* to the Sarkar appeal. Sarkar is named as a respondent because he invoked Rule 5.13(g) while pursuing an appeal in an Article III court in an attempt to convert a trade secret into a patent grant. Secrecy for such a reason has not been granted before and for good reason; the courts have always before been open in such direct appeals.

There is nothing in CCPA Rule 5.13(g) which suggests that it can be used *carte blanche* to circumvent an established practice of the past 139 years involving open court proceedings when someone is trying to convert his trade secret to a patent grant. The present matter involves the trade secret/patent interface and not an ordinary trade secret situation as covered or dealt with in the *Kewanee* case. It is suggested in the memorandum for the respondent judges that CCPA Rule 5.13(g) is merely an analogue to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). The latter rule involves practice during pretrial depositions and not a direct patent appeal in an Article III court where the *sole* basis of the action is to seek an *exclusionary right* by patent.

It is also suggested in the memorandum for the respondent judges that it would be "anomalous" to force

an applicant to risk forfeiture of his trade secret in trying to secure a patent by appeal to the CCPA. This risk has been run in every direct patent appeal heard in that court (and its predecessors) save this one for 139 years. The rule as interpreted here violates petitioner's constitutional rights (and the rights of the public at large) granted by the First, Fifth, Ninth, or Tenth Amendments.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that a writ of certiorari issue to redress this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

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**PETITIONER'S RULE 24(4) REPLY
TO RESPONDENT SARKAR**

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Respondent Sarkar's Brief in Opposition appears largely to be an *ad hominem* argument that does not fully address the public interest issue raised by the petition. Quite understandably, Sarkar places heavy emphasis upon his own private

interest with little or no real consideration, either in principle or on the merits, to the larger public interest issue raised in the petition.

For the sake of completeness it remains only to respond briefly to errors appearing in the respondent Sarkar's brief:

Page 3, first paragraph: The record shows something quite different. As indicated in the decision of the court below (App. 1-b), Sarkar filed his certified transcript of the proceedings in the PTO on February 13, 1978 simultaneously with "a timely appeal". He therefore had perfected his appeal on that day. But the lower court's decision on closure was not handed down until May 11, 1978 (App. 1-b). It is therefore difficult to see how Sarkar could have relied upon the lower court's decision to hold the case *in camera* at the time he perfected his appeal nearly three months earlier.

Page 3, third full paragraph: Sarkar erroneously asserts that petitioner is "attempting to now bring Sarkar's record before this Court". This is something petitioner neither desires nor would find it possible to do so long as the record in the court below remains sealed.

Page 5, second paragraph: Sarkar asserts that the issuance of the patent (in the event of a favorable* decision) makes public the entire record, thus rendering the petition moot. This anticipation of what might happen is somewhat questionable in view of the fact that the lower court's order appears in turn to be a closure order *without any qualification*. See Appendix 5-b. In any event, Sarkar's suggestion of possible mootness is not well taken. It is well settled that where a substantial question involving the public interest is likely to be a recurring one, the fact that in the particular case under consideration events may have rendered moot any possible relief as to the particular parties is not sufficient to deprive the Court of jurisdiction. *Moore v. Ogilvie*, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) at 816; *Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle*, 416 U.S. 115 (1974) at 125-6.

* In the actual event, the C.C.P.A. on December 7th *affirmed* the rejection of all of Sarkar's claims.

Page 6, first full paragraph: Sarkar asserts that if this petition were to be granted "as to the *Sarkar* case," the appellate process on the merits "would have to stop". This overlooks the fact that both the court below and the Chief Justice (as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit) have already denied a motion for stay and an application for stay, respectively.

Page 6, second full paragraph: Sarkar asserts that if this petition were granted "the C.C.P.A. record would be sent to the U.S. Supreme Court". It is difficult to see why this should be so since the granting of the petition would merely mean that this Court agrees to hear the question involved, without requiring for its resolution the *actual production* of the record.

Page 8, first paragraph: This paragraph overlooks the fact that the slipsheet opinion of the lower court did not reveal the address of Sarkar or the name(s) and address of Sarkar's attorney(s). The latter information was revealed *for the first time* in the unofficial report of this case in the weekly advance sheets of the United States Patents Quarterly for June 19, 1978 (197 U.S.P.Q. 788). Since petitioner's motion or petition was filed in the court below on June 8, 1978 (App. 2-c), it obviously was *impossible* for petitioner to effect service at that time. See also the Appendix at 3-c and the footnote by the court below in *In re Mosher* appearing in the Appendix at page 1-a, footnote 1.

CONCLUSION

If all that was "endangered" in the case at bar were Sarkar's trade secrets, no one could reasonably expect this Court to be particularly interested. What is *really* at stake here, however, is the unbroken tradition of 139 years of open court records and open court hearings in direct appeals from the Patent Office. This is the issue of profound public importance that takes this case out of the ordinary and makes it certworthy. This Court should grant certiorari with a view to ruling on the merits of the closure order of the court below.

Respectfully submitted,

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